Paper: | PS-1B.16 |
Session: | Poster Session 1B |
Location: | Symphony/Overture |
Session Time: | Thursday, September 6, 18:45 - 20:45 |
Presentation Time: | Thursday, September 6, 18:45 - 20:45 |
Presentation: |
Poster
|
Publication: |
2018 Conference on Cognitive Computational Neuroscience, 5-8 September 2018, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania |
Paper Title: |
Non-Computational Functionalism: Computation and the Function of Consciousness |
Manuscript: |
Click here to view manuscript |
DOI: |
https://doi.org/10.32470/CCN.2018.1022-0 |
Authors: |
Gualtiero Piccinini, University of Missouri - Saint Louis, United States |
Abstract: |
The view that the mind, including phenomenal consciousness, has a functional nature (functionalism) does not entail that the mind has a wholly computational nature (computational functionalism). An unappreciated option is that the mind has a functional yet non-computational nature. This latter option, non-computational functionalism, is not a type-identity theory either, because it posits that phenomenal consciousness is constituted by higher-level properties that are not identical to lower-level physical states. |